Andres Oppenheimer of the Miami Herald wrote an intriguing piece recently on the splash effect of the coup, or crisis, or whatever term least offends someone of Honduras’ new leadership and recent election, and how the major powers in Latin America have tried unsuccessfully to remedy the situation. Oppenheimer argues that the US, Brazil and the OAS have all succeeded in failure in their own unique ways. Failure for the three comes as follows. For Brazil, its “hypocrisy” of recognizing Iran’s and Cuba’s undemocratic leadership, while criticizing Honduras’ recent elections. For the US, the “flip-flopping” that comes with a constant backtracking of statements on Honduras. This is most poignantly shown in the support the US gives to the new government, while asking for greater cooperation, often after the fact when it is too late to alter elections or policy decisions. The OAS, comes in with its own actions of “one-sidedness” for taking the side of Zelaya completely and ignoring the rights and established powers of the institutions of Honduras and their legal system in ousting the former President. The Oppenheimer article is one of great interest and makes very strong points against the major powers in the region, one well worth a read.

Many of the criticisms of the article, the main powers in the region, and the Honduran actors themselves are not ones that began or will end in Honduras. The key question is why we are so interested in Honduras in the first place? The result of their elections will not have any significant effect on the region, and many of the countries in Central America are more left wing or more right wing than Honduras’s will ever become. It is more likely that the reaction by the powers in the region come at a time where their future foreign policy and their position in the world has not yet been scribed, namely, this minor coup; or whatever one might call it, is the first real test of new governments in the US and new foreign policies that have yet to be refined in Brazil.

Working from the ground up, the OAS often sways with the wind that blows the strongest, namely the US can push the OAS in the direction is most desires with the response coming from states which have previously not been members, such as Cuba, or those who have limited sway in the region leading its greatest opposition. In the end, words are exchanged and little is enforced without the push from major powers in the region. The US position on Zelaya shaped much of the OAS’ reaction as most of the Americas initially responded to the crisis in Honduras in a similar fashion.

The US on Honduras is a symbol of America’s lack of effectiveness on many foreign issues, but is more of a reflection of the passive response to Latin America by the US since 2002, with the exception of Mexico in 2008 and to some degree Colombia. A reflection of this is the successful operation in freeing Ingrid Betancourt and strikes by the Colombian Army against the FARC. While success came from the Colombian Army and US assistance, the rescue was attributed in the narrative to Colombia’s relative strength, even freeing some US citizens in the process. Giving credit to Colombia’s armed forces was paramount in the discussion of the rescue and the events which took place before the operation. In the narrative, the US gave a lot of the credit to Colombia itself, downplaying US intelligence support in the war against the FARC as a whole. Since 2008, the US role in Latin America has not yet been well defined. After a lack of attention since the second year of the Bush Administration and the new economic challenges creating an environment of protectionism vs. globalism, debates on Latin America in the US has yet to come to a clear policy decision. If the US wants its neighbours to become economic partners in the Americas, it has done little to reinforce this policy among its allies in the region. If the US decides to pull back from its international role and solve its economic and policy challenges on its own, most of its allies will take issue with this stance on foreign policy worldwide. Honduras is the first major issue in the Americas for the new US Administration, and to some degree “flip-flopping” is a result of indecisiveness in general and the lack of interest in Honduras when the media focus was not highlighting the problems with Zelaya and the Honduran government. Whatever the US plans to do with Honduras, it is likely not going to affect the final outcome of the new Honduran leadership, nor become the beginning of a new US policy towards Latin America.

Brazil is in an interesting position. Zelaya, knowing the possible influence Brazil will have in the future in the region and worldwide, chose to take refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in Honduras, thus dragging Brazil in the middle of the discussion on Honduras. Many on the left and right of the political spectrum see Brazil as a natural mediator to the region’s political debates. Brazil is a rising power, and can speak to everyone without being named as having a clear bias for or against the Chavistas, Castro supporters, US Hawks or US allies in Latin America. This position however is challenging as Brazil’s influence also is pressuring it to side with one international power or the other. Recently Brazil has welcomed representatives from Iran, and previously from Israel as well. Brazil is comfortable maintaining open ties with Venezuela and speaking directly to the US and Obama, as well as China and Europe on the many forums on the world stage. Brazil seeks to avoid many debates past issuing statements in order to keep an open path to growth and ties with any nation who wishes to support Brazil’s growing economy. Actions by Brazil which might be seen as “hypocrisy” could also be defined as avoiding conflict with major powers globally and in Latin America to keep Brazil growing at the expense of local and regional issues that at the moment do not directly affect Brazil. While the US is often pushed to decide on a policy on foreign conflicts, Brazil is simply being pulled into a conflict that many in Brazil would surely be happy to avoid completely.

The possibility of a lack of interest in Honduras by major powers could explain many contradictory policy actions my major powers in the Americas. The OAS, US and Brazil will eventually have to choose which relations in the region are worth promoting for internal reasons, and might have to create clear policy approaches to allies and foes in the region. Honduras and actions by Zelaya have polarized many supporters on each side of the debate, but issues in that country likely will not define the future of the region, or policy responses by major powers in the region in the long run. I cannot disagree with the conclusions of Mr. Oppenheimer, but at the same time the actions by the three agents of change in Latin America do not surprise me when discussing the crisis in Honduras.