Laura Chinchilla was elected president in Costa Rica’s elections held on Sunday. A former justice minister and vice president, Ms. Chinchilla nabbed 47% of the vote, easily outpacing her campaign rivals.

Long known as a halcyon enclave amidst the poverty and lawlessness of Central America, Costa Rica has fell victim to its geography of late. Crime is on the rise, and while still tame by most comparisons, the murder rate now doubles that of Chile. Improving security was the centerpiece of Ms. Chinchilla’s campaign. Speaking to a crowd just before the election she said, “Central America could be the last battlefield of war taking place between Colombia and Mexico.”

Suspicions are that former president Óscar Arias will hold sway under Chinchilla’s term. Both of her campaign opponents depicted her as a puppet of the Arias, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in the end to Central America’s wars in the 1980s.

With a revival of aid and interest in Haiti post-earthquake and another round of bickering from Latin America’s left wing leaders accusing the US of occupying Haiti in their aid efforts, the rest of the Americas and the world have taken to sending support and aid to Haiti, running collection campaigns and rescue teams to the island from China to Israel and everyone in between.

It is somewhat surprising that debate on sending immediate aid to Haiti is an issue for anyone considering any assistance is a welcomed site in Haiti. Most countries of varying political stripes seem to be unanimous in getting aid there quickly, effectively and keeping it there for a long enough time to bring Haiti back in order, or at least to a state of relative stability for a country that is well known for being one of, if not the poorest in the Americas. While the US has had its role in the Haitian political system in the past, it is hardly acceptable to target relief efforts as a means to an occupation, when it is clear that everyone working there and saving lives is clearly their principle concern.

Often any debate in the region is characterized by one theme, that of a left-right divide and who allies with the US or with Latin America’s left wing governments. Haiti, while being part of the Americas usually receives little to no attention as the history of the island comes from a non-Hispanic heritage, of strong non-Western faiths and as former French colony that is often ignored by others in the region or is left as an issue for the Francophonie in its yearly meetings. This does not mean that Haiti is not important, but that among all the issues in the Americas and the domination of Spanish, English and Portuguese media, that Haiti is often left on the latter pages of news coverage on the Americas. Some attention to Haiti has come from Quebec and Canada, as the other French language region of the Americas with a strong Haitian community. It also helps that the Governor General of Canada, the official leader of Canada’s government is Michelle Jean who is of Haitian origin. Despite these ties however, Haiti has only become a topic of interest not after years of poverty which was a major contributor to much of the chaos during the earthquake, and unequal relations with other nations in the Americas and Europe, but after a disaster.

Does the left-right divide in this case not include all people and all issues in the Americas? It is likely the case that a dominant theory was used to explain issues that have always existed in the region, and that the left-right debate is applied, often mistakenly, as a theory to explain the causes of various issues in modern times. What were referred to as the Communists in the pre-1989 world in the Americas was Castro and Cuba for the most part and some allies of Castro in the Americas. Castroism was defined simply by many as anything that was anti-American, even though it has the optics of being a more academic debate. While Castroism was not a useful theory to explain all issues in the region, it enabled experts and policymakers to have a tool to explain the motivations for the Communists in the Americas as well as US policy towards the region. With the left-right debate, Communist explanations of recent events and motivations, as well as historical examples of the past get muddled when challenging motivations for American aid in Haiti, or the recent win of Pinera in Chile, the first democratically elected conservative to win in the country since the end of the Pinochet era.

Last week the end of an era in Chilean politics was made when Sebastian Pinera won the runoff election in the country, becoming the first conservative canadidate to win against the Concertacion coalition of left and centre candidates in Chile since 1990. The greatest surprise is that Michelle Bachelet, who was the leader of the governing party opposed to Pinera’s had an 81% approval rating and maintained a strong economy in the middle of a global recession. This surprising result might have come from many sources, one being that Bachelet did not run, and that Eduardo Frei, a former President of Chile ran against Pinera and the other candidate. Perhaps Frei’s former record haunted him in this race, but more likely it was the vision of Chile as a stable country and lack of identity between the candidates that ensured his political fate. Chile might been seen as coming out of an election with the assurance by left of centre and right of centre politicians that economic growth would be slow and stable. Like the successes of such policies in other Latin American nations and the constant malaise of political contests in most developed nations, Chile’s latest race might show that like in many European and Western countries, that candidates in relatively wealthy economies do not differ much in substance, and only slightly differ in ideology in a globalised economy. Chile’s “success” as a well managed left of centre government is not due to classic left wing policies, but is a confirmation that Chile qualifies to fit into what Thomas L Friedman described as economies being managed to a lesser or greater degree within a Golden Straitjacket. Basically it is not a left wing policy approach or right wing roots that makes Chile pro-Chavez or pro-USA, but simply managing being part of a globalised economy and those rules with are presumed in such an economy.

In Latin America most of the countries who many would see as successful come with slow and responsible growth, with conservative economic approaches and socially oriented approaches to reduce poverty and promote relative equality. With a history of large inequality and great amounts of poverty, all Latin American countries should be a mix of left and right wing policy approaches, what we can name logical policy initiatives. It would be better to define the region into strong US allies, populists managing poverty and various success stories which give credit to open and innovative policy approaches. All countries in the region have been innovative when dealing with aid, poverty reduction and slow growth, but it is those countries which can welcome new theories and new approaches that are the ones that can innovate and succeed. The Golden Straitjacket allows for little more than that, and if it makes politics less exciting and populists less convincing it could be best for many countries, even the often forgotten Haiti.

Amidst the horror, criticism, and yes, punditry, only cursory attention has been paid to the forces that made Haiti the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, even before the earthquake. Haiti’s woes were not a foregone conclusion: over two centuries ago it became the second independent country in the Americas. As a colony Haiti accounted for about half of France’s foreign reserves. What happened? The Dominican Republic, which occupies the eastern side of the island of Hispañola, offers a standard of comparison.

Spanish is spoken in the DR, a glib observation no doubt, but one with vast implication. Spanish is the world’s second most widely spoken language, including over half of the Americas. Meanwhile, some 85-90% of Haitians speak Haitian Creole, leaving the country in a state of “linguistic isolation,” argues Jared Diamond, in his forthcoming book Natural Experiments of History. This not only impedes Haiti from integration with other parts of the Franco-sphere, save a few Caribbean outposts, it has nursed a chasm with Haiti’s elites, who speak formal French.

Environmental reasons also play a factor. Haiti is steeper than the DR, hence more prone to land slides and soil erosion, and drier, Hispañola’s rains come from the East, blanketing the DR before reaching Haiti. With scant natural resources and twice the population density of the DR, Haiti has few competitive advantages.

Still, Haiti’s retardation was not foreordained. Government has played a huge role. Two generations ago, a pair of ruthless strongmen, Rafael Trujillo in the DR, and Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier in Haiti, ruled each side of Hispañola. Trujillo was a cruel dictator, ruling from the 1930s until his assassination in 1961, but he sat in well with the US until the twilight of his reign because he was an ardent anti-communist. The DR progressively developed trade links to the outside world as Trujillo personally owned most of the nation’s exporting industries, from chocolate factories, to shipping lines, to timber. Calculating that he would stay in power for a very long time, Trujillo brought in Swedish advisors to make forestry sustainable in the DR. The plan worked. Thus, Trujillo left an economic legacy for the DR as democracy took hold after his death.

Papa Doc, on the other hand, loathed the United States. The invasion of US Marines in 1915, and a series of US-installed puppet governments over the course of the next two decades, forged his political views. Duvalier became a devotee of the anti-colonial négritude movement, and espoused Vodou. These antecedents bucked Duvalier’s political rise, but they did little to warm relations with foreign powers, or investors. After harshly (and bizarrely) quelling a coup attempt, and misappropriating aid money, the US cut off economic assistance to Haiti in mid-1962. Aid was soon renewed to help combat communism in Haiti. Foreign aid, dispersed under the reign of the Duvaliers (after Papa’s death, “Baby Doc” succeeded his father, until he was forced into exile in 1986), became the lifeblood of venal officials and family cronies.

Weighing these factors, some will home in on geography, others on language. Still others, like Jeff Sachs, insist that the United States has made Haiti a basket case. All played some part, but I believe that domestic governance, especially in the recent past, accounts for the disparity between the two sides of Hispañola. Half a century ago the DR was maybe 25% richer than Haiti–now the DR is six times richer than Haiti. Under his reign, Trujillo sought riches through trade. The Duvaliers were contented to raid the treasury. Haiti continues to pay the price.

Early estimates place the death toll around 50,000 in Haiti, and another 3 million Haitians are feared to be injured or homeless. No one really knows, and casualties could rise if aid efforts are inefficacious.

Several impediments are complicating aid delivery. Aid started arriving hours after the quake, but has just started to trickle out. The immediate bottleneck is the Port-au-Prince Airport, where the runway endured the earthquake structurally intact, but the control tower and radar were left inoperable. The airport tarmac was so clogged yesterday that they couldn’t unload relief supplies, and some didn’t have enough fuel for their return flight, leading to a temporary ban on non-military landings.

Other transport routes are worse off. The seaport is badly damaged, and the roads around the capital are impassible.

Intergovernmental cooperation has, so far, eased rescue efforts. Cuba has permitted the United States access to its air space, cutting down on flight times to Haiti by 90 minutes. This morning the Haitian government agreed to cede control of the airport to the US military, a move that is speeding delivery.

Reports of looting are, thankfully to this point, few. Should looting become more rampant that could restrict relief efforts to daylight, and possibly crimp donations.

A less immediate concern is Haiti’s political future. Currently the US military is the actor most capable of managing rescue and relief, but in the next few days, or maybe a fortnight, it will be in an awkward situation if President Préval cannot reassert order. Another potential problem is the re-entry of deposed president Aristide into Haiti. Should he return from exile in South Africa, as he wants to do, he could sew factionalism that further challenges Préval’s government.

Few people are unaware of the earthquake to hit Haiti on Tuesday evening and information about the number of victims and difficulties in getting aid and assistance to Haiti in time in order to free those trapped under rubble, to give food and water and to give medical treatment is coming out by the minute. Many countries are making a valiant attempt to send crisis relief workers and assistance and remove their citizens from the Haitian capital Port-au-Prince or via a land route coming from The Dominican Republic. Large Haitian immigrant communities in Paris and France, as well in Quebec, Canada in the city of Montreal have created networks for the Haitian communities in those countries abroad to pass info to families and distribute information to local charities to help relieve some suffering for their families and communities in Haiti. Canada’s Governor General, the Queen’s representative for Canada is of Haitian origin and has made an emotional appeal for assistance to the Haitian people. While information is constantly being streamed in from Haiti, I encourage all to seek out their local charities and aid organizations for donations and try to keep any information coming through twitter and blogs, and avoid publishing any rumours if at all possible as a focus on aid and assistance is crucial. As well, for those blogging and writing on Haiti, I encourage all to keep the focus on the issues surrounding Haiti as much as possible in order to keep this often forgotten country on the front pages of world media and charities.

Here are some local charitable organizations to contact for aiding those in Haiti. Please find your local Red Cross or Red Crescent as well as World Vision, UNICEF and Oxfam. Some links for countries with Haitian immigrant communities are listed below. I encourage people to publish more in the commentary if possible:

France:
http://www.fondationdefrance.org/La-Fondation-de-France/Actualites/Solidarite-Haiti

http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=2833184A-15C5-F00A-25B39745CCF0E568&component=toolkit.article&method=full_html

UK:
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/oxfam_in_action/emergencies/haiti-earthquake.html

http://www.msf.org.uk/

USA:
http://www.haiti.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=131&catid=69

http://www.usaid.gov/ht/

http://www.wfp.org/stories/haiti-wfp-bring-food-devastating-quake

http://www.savethechildren.org/newsroom/2010/haiti-relief.html

http://donate.worldvision.org/OA_HTML/xxwv2ibeCCtpItmDspRte.jsp?funnel=dn&item=1958776§ion=10324&go=item&

Canada:
http://www.redcross.ca/article.asp?id=33900&tid=001.

http://www.msf.ca/news-media/news/2010/01/haiti-update/

http://www.worldvision.ca/Pages/Home.aspx

Martin Redrado was always an economist of great interest. In his first weeks in office I was lucky enough to see Mr. Redrado give a talk at the LSE on the many economic struggles faced by Argentina and Argentina’s central bank since 2001. A few key points were made at the beginning of his term as the governor of the bank. In good humour, he apologised for the chaos of previous bank policies and made the point that the bank had to claim some responsibility for failed policies of the past in order to be successful in the future. He also made it clear that slow growth and the de-politicisation of the bank is a crucial part of regaining Argentina’s stability and re-entrance into the global economy as a competitive nation. His last major point was that the models and transparency of the bank has to be beyond clear to investors in order to normalize the economy of South America’s second largest economic power.

Despite many years of modest surpluses in Argentina, the default in 2001 still has the effect of limiting access to international capital markets for Argentina. The fact that international investors do not have much faith in Argentina’s investment climate, and bondholders since 2005 refused to accept Argentina’s debt restructuring leaves President Kirchner limited avenues for finding extra revenues. While post 2002 resulted in Nestor and Cristina Kirchner being the only ones who wished to tackle Argentina’s debt crisis after a series of failed presidencies due to the collapse of the Peso. Despite economic gains post 2003 until the 2008 crisis, recent years and pressures have matted out the shine of their positive achievements. Battles with the opposition in Congress have left Kirchner with fewer options, as the opposition gained a majority in Congress last summer and economic troubles to the north have set not only Argentina, but all economies on a voyage to find extra funding. In an unwise and perhaps desperate move, Kirchner chose to challenge the one Che in power who has economic stability in mind, that of Central Bank governor Martin Redrado.

Today, Redrado has survived his ousting as bank governor by President Cristina Kirchner via a legal challenge last Friday. The Executive wished to transfer $6.6 billion of Argentina’s foreign currency reserves to service public debt, but with the Central Bank being legally independent from the Executive branch, Congressional support is needed in order to authorize the transfer of funds. Therefore when Redrado asked to study his legal options in the matter of a transfer issued by President Kirchner, Kirchner sought to remove him from his position. Legal quarrels however forced Kirchner to keep Redrado as governor as a judge in Argentina re-clarified his independent legal position as Central Bank governor where he remains today. Kirchner insists that opposition leaders in Congress seek to block the Presidency from addressing issues of national debt, but with the legal ruling restricting her and Redrado’s staunch statements claiming himself as a professional economist and not a politician, he might be the only one limiting small yet significant run on the Argentine Peso in this current political skirmish since the failures of 2001. A likely conclusion will be a compromise, where Kirchner calls in favours and taxes on other parts of the economy, with whatever is left, and Redrado gives her some reserves, albeit with a measured amount to maintain Argentina’s economic reputation and of course in a polite manner.

While Redrado fights to keep Argentina’s economy out of the negative spotlight, Venezuela’s economy has made world headlines with the devaluation of the Bolivar, Venezuela’s currency. Venezuela and Argentina often lead a fight in the region for Latin America’s highest inflation rate, while being two very different economies. Venezuela’s devaluation comes from several different factors, but the largest rationale for the move is in order to gain added revenues from Venezuela’s lucrative oil exports. Oil in Venezuela has become very much a part of the reserves for Presidential policies, even lending funds to Argentina, mind you at a higher rate now than in the past. The devaluation will likely give Chavez more money and political clout via added spending on his projects and give him a popular boost before legislative elections take place in September. Rates on essential food and medicine imports being set at a lower rate than non-essential goods is also part of the new exchange rate, officially being a two tier rate with a second higher rate being applied to imported good deemed as ‘non-essential’. A third tier rate might arise out of the black market however, as Venezuelan companies who are not favoured by the government’s social reforms will have a harder time getting US Dollars and turn to other means to keep afloat. With Venezuelans running out to buy consumer goods before the new exchange rates take effect, and security forces being ordered to enforce against any retail price hikes on any retailers who overcharge consumers, the image of any Latin American running to the streets to spend their soon to be devalued currency is not often one that gives confidence to many investors. Despite this, the long run impression of devaluations in Venezuela is seen as political, but not wholly unjustified as Venezuela is essentially an oil economy and has to address falling oil prices in many markets. Redrado no doubt wishes to keep Argentina’s reserves out of the political fray of local politics and not turn the Peso into a currency based on one commodity or one person’s political ambitions. While Venezuela’s economic policies are validly criticised for their inherently political motivations, Argentina does not have an oil cushion to soften any economic blows, and must rely on investor confidence in its reserves and creativity by the Kirchners in order to cover their end of the year 13 billion dollar debt payment.

Every so often a story of a unique nature, crossing many different previously unrelated countries and debates arises when studying Latin America and globalisation. Colombia has now become one of the destinations for migrants who wish to go to the US, but originally coming from Africa, as opposed to from the rest of Latin America. Many issues involving African migrants relate to threatened Somalis going to Yemen and Saudi Arabia as well as economic migrants coming into Europe, in both cases via make shift boats or via smugglers that overload otherwise structurally sound smaller boats. The debate surrounding African migrants has dominated migration and human rights issues in both regions. The issue of legal rights and security for African migrants has become one of the most difficult policy concerns to address for many in the Middle East and Europe. Detailed accounts of lives being lost at sea, and refugees being returned to Africa has constantly headlined papers in Spain, Italy, Malta, Portugal and the EU as a whole. Accounts from human rights agencies have often criticised inhumane treatment of African boat people by the government of Yemen and even EU border patrols in the Mediterranean and between the African coast and the Spanish territory of the Canary Islands. Now African migrants are showing up in the Caribbean, and it is curious to find out how and why this is occurring so far away from Africa.

Cesar Sabogal who writes for the South African publication Mail & Guardian Online published an article this past weekend on the movement of African migrants towards Colombia specifically. According to Colombia’s head of intelligence and migration service, African migrants choose Colombia as a destination in the Americas due to its access to the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean and its close proximity to Central American ports to help gain access into the US. Many claim refugee status in Colombia as well, despite Colombia having one of the highest rates of internally displaced citizens in the world. Many people trafficking networks have sprung up in Colombia; in some cases being run by African’s themselves. In 2009 alone, Colombia expelled 285 African and Asian citizens, with the average African paying approximately $5000USD to be trafficked into the US. Colombian officials also pointed out that many traffickers end up working with or for drug traffickers as well, trading information on routes to access Central America and the US. While many African migrants claim refugee status in Colombia, it is difficult to know who is a refugee for human rights issues and who is an economic refugee. Most migrants who reached Colombia were from Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Benin, Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, according to the foreign ministry. Colombia also receives migrants from Asia, but most are African migrants who often come to Colombia’s port of Buenaventura.

African migrants to Latin America do not only arrive in Colombia according to Luis Andres Henao of the same publication above. In his November 2009 article, he discusses the number of Africans seeking refugee status in Argentina and Brazil. With restrictions in Europe now becoming increasingly enforced against many African asylum seekers, countries in the Americas have become a second distant options. In Brazil alone, 65% of asylum seekers originate from Africa, and in Argentina, 3000 African refugees now reside with 1000 refugees a year coming into the country from abroad, mostly from Africa. This growth trend comes with increasing security in Europe and will likely increase exponentially as trade flows from Asia and Africa grow with the Southern Cone and refugee policies remain the same in Colombia, Argentina and Brazil. A debate might arise, as immigration in North America is often seen as adding to nations already full of immigrants in addition to the same issue and the rationale in Europe as creating a young workforce to support the tax base for the large number of retired people that will become an issue in most developed countries in the near future. In Latin America however, which is a relatively young population, and the source of many émigrés to North America and Europe might see refugees from Africa as defying the cultural norms and displacing work that many locals do require. This traditional immigrant debate will be one of interest if the African and Asian refugee trend continues to the region, as Argentina, Brazil and Colombia have also had large numbers of immigrants come to their shores in the past, and have made for an intriguing cultural dynamic in Latin America.

It’s hard to resist presidential decree. Yesterday, after calling for his resignation, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner issued a decree to remove the governor of Argentina’s Central Bank, Martín Redrado, from his post. The impasse has been brewing for some time, coming to a head this week.

Kirchner wanted Redrado to devote $6.6 billion in foreign currency reserves to paying off national debt. Meeting a $13 billion debt that comes due this year is critical to Argentina regaining access to global credit markets, which left the nation isolated after its 2001 default, the largest external default in history. Since then, the weight of default has been eased by strong economic growth, particularly from 2003-2007, and large loans offered to Argentina by Hugo Chavez. Now growth is flagging, and the interest rate on Mr. Chavez’s loans exceeds 10%.

Tax hikes or entitlement cuts are the more orthodox tools under such circumstances. These appear a bit too sour to the political palette of the president, who told reporters “It was not Redrado who gathered the reserves, it was the government.” True enough, but sacking Redrado and raiding foreign reserves is bound to spark a short-term backlash. A sell-off of the peso seems inevitable. Mark Mobius, executive chairman of Templeton Asset Management, said investors should “generally” avoid Argentina.

More troubling are the medium-to-long-term implications. The independence of central banks throughout the region is critical to economic stability. Should the banks (once again) become the handmaiden of populist politicians the beast of inflation may return—already Argentina has Latin America’s second-highest rate of inflation, eclipsed by Venezuela.

Jorge Castaneda is a policymaker and professor of great interest who writes about Mexico and Latin America as a whole. During my time working in Washington DC, it seemed like he put off many policymakers inside the Beltway during his time as Mexico’s Foreign Minister as part of the Fox Administration from 2000 to 2003. Many claim he left that position in 2003 due to his open and honest approach, some would say overly honest approach, towards policymaking between the US and Latin America. Currently he teaches at NYU, and over the years has produced some very strong centrist articles and books on topics covering Mexico, Latin American foreign policy and US foreign policy towards Latin America. Last week he wrote a fascinating article in The New Republic that will likely characterize policy towards the region over the next decade. The Article at TNR.com called Adios, Monroe Doctrine: When the Yanquis go home is Mr. Castaneda’s contribution to the series of New Years 2010 articles predicting the future of the region over the next twelve months and longer. He discusses the lack of involvement the US has had in the region over the last few years, and is one of the few experts on foreign policy in the region who has praised the reduction of US involvement, while pointing out that the US needs to still realize its natural role within Latin America.

Castaneda is one of the few writers on Latin American relations who writes in the same un-tempered fashion in Spanish for the Latin American audience as he does in English for a mostly US based audience. While policymaking involves wording criticism diplomatically as well as achieving goals which are often based on compromise as well as interest, his activities as an academic at NYC allows for open critical thought as well as a balanced and realistic approach towards US-Latin American relations. This is surely a result of his time as a diplomat affecting his time as an academic, and is appreciated on a practical level. His recent article is a reflection of this, as he asks the question whether the lack of US involvement is due to an inability to control conflicts in the region, or does the US simply not care about Latin America as a whole? He points out two major issues in the region over the last decade, that of the degree and failure of US involvement in ousting Chavez, and the will to construct an immigration wall on the US-Mexico border. Generally those two “major” policy events have had little impact on US relations as a whole. Chavez’s experience in possibly becoming a victim of an assassination attempt has become the core thesis of every speech he has given since 2002, and will soon be put on the big screen by director Oliver Stone, and the poor economic conditions in the US has reduced the number of migrants crossing the border for the time being. US allies in the region have had their own successes, namely Brazil economically, and Colombia in ensuring its own internal security, or at least giving a lot of reassurance to Colombia’s citizens that the government is regaining control for the first time in a generation. The leftists in the region have had some influence as well, but have not changed the environment for the US to such a degree that massive involvement by the US in the region would make a difference for Obama or the US in general. Most left wing criticisms still do focus on the US, but a lack of action by the US might force left wing leaders to claim personal responsibility for any internal issues as opposed to using the US as a scapegoat, whether they had involvement or not. The history of the US in Latin America does give a lot of ammunition to leftists in the region, but with Venezuela still selling oil to the US and Ecuador still basing its currency on US dollars, rhetoric does not seem to have much influence these days on actual policy, albeit as long as everyone knows where to draw the line between actions and words.

Castaneda writes that two events might return the US to its former position as hegemon of Latin America. While many elections in smaller countries have been influenced by left wing leaders in Latin America, a country like Peru, with a lot of US investment, might create a cause for a stricter response from the US if this larger and wealthier nation were to become the next Venezuela. Recent nationalisations without just compensation of industries in Venezuela by the office of the President is likely the expected line in the sand for US involvement in Venezuela, but would not be seen as acceptable towards US companies in Peru. Another action that would likely elicit a strong response from the US is the increase in physical activities between Iran and Venezuela. While Brazil has opened some ties with Iran economically, political ties linking weapons or nuclear exchanges has been discouraged in Brazil. These ties however have been encouraged by Chavez in Venezuela, and while Castaneda claims that those ties are simply rhetoric in nature at the moment, he also states that a physical exchange would bring a strong response from the US, especially considering the amount of Russian arms that have been flowing into Venezuela recently and if those arms are found to be sent to Iran, or nuclear material is found to be send to Venezuela.

While we often write about similar issues on the Latin America Blog, it is interesting to compare and contrast similar debates with other experts. While there is a lot of agreement on the issues, I wished to note that there was no discussion of trade between places like China, and how that might affect US relations with Latin America, as it would affect relations between the US and Iran, or the US and Africa. I encourage comments on these topics and hope that everyone will take a moment to read Jorge Castaneda’s article. It is quite fascinating.

The twilight of 2009 gave cause to celebrate for gay rights activists in Latin America. Same-sex marriage was legalized in Mexico City ten days ago to campaigners’ chants of “yes we can.” In a separate motion the city assembly also sanctioned adoption by gay couples. Then, in Ushuaia, Argentina’s southernmost city, Alex Freyer and José María di Bello exchanged vowels, becoming the first gay couple to marry in Latin America.

Alex and José’s story was poignantly covered on PRI’s The World, and bears repeating. Each man is a noted human rights campaigner, and each is HIV-positive. Their battle to be married was meant not only as “a romantic proposal” but a “political proposal” too, according to Alex. After originally being told “no” when they applied for a marriage license in the Argentine capital, the men sued, claiming violation of their constitutional rights. A judge ruled in their favor. The couple was originally slated for a Buenos Aires wedding on December 1, but a higher-level court nixed the ceremony at the last minute. Their dream was finally realized on December 28.

Should Argentina legalize same-sex marriage, Uruguay, which became the first nation in the region to legalize same-sex civil unions in 2007 and adoption by gay couples in September, would likely follow suit. Chile probably wouldn’t be far behind. Alex thinks Buenos Aires could start it all: “We win this round…Now the rainbow is here. You know when we say ‘Somewhere over the rainbow.’ It’s here! It’s in Buenos Aires.” By the end of 2010 the Southern Cone could form a rainbow row of countries that permit same-sex couples to marry, and possibly adopt.

Activists are hoping that just such a domino effect will transform the region. Editorial pages in Chile asked when that nation would approve gay marriage. Amidst the tumult of Alex and José’s fight, on December 23 ten same-sex couples in Rosario, Argentina, filed legal motions demanding the right to marry. Unfortunately for likeminded same-sex partners in Argentina, the December 28 ceremony does not set legal precedent—the state governor issued the couple a special decree.

Constitutions and the Catholic Church pose significant barriers to a watershed of same-sex marriages in the region. In Mexico, social liberalization in the capital has, so far, engendered sweeping conservative backlash. Take abortion. In 2007, Mexico City moved to allow elective abortion. The past two years have seen a slew of abortion bans, spanning 17 of 32 Mexican states, many of which are more punitive to women than pre-existing prohibitions. Now a nationwide abortion ban is in the offing. That’s because amendments to the Mexican Constitution can be proposed by individual states. If an amendment passes Congress, support by a simple majority of states will make it law. Armando Martínez, head of Mexico’s Catholic Lawyers College, forecasts a similar pushback “because Mexican culture is not ready for these things and they [the city assembly] can release a level homophobia that no one will be able to stop.” Mexico City taking a step forward in ’09 could mean Mexico taking two steps back this year, or next.

Legal options offer more hope in Argentina—civil unions have been permitted in Buenos Aires since 2002—but mores are much the same as in Mexico, and elsewhere.

And the issue of adoption by gay couples remains prickly. While the news of Mexico City’s legalization was met with the predictable array of hysteria and ho-hums, public opinion in Mexico seems decidedly opposed to adoption by gay couples. The comment page of Mexico City’s leading daily, El Universal, registered over 1,000 entries for its story on same-sex marriage and adoption, most vociferously opposed to the adoption measure. Isaac Villa, a 35-year-old taxi driver in the capital told TIME, “If two men want to be together, that is their decision. But adopting children is a different story.” Another resident said, “Children growing up in a gay marriage would be traumatized.”

In my view, activists must hone their political tactics. The headlong charge for marriage, and adoption, is likely to disaffect droves. Latin America is (nominally, at least) the most religious region on earth; most nations are 90% Roman Catholic, and the silent majority remains conservative on social issues. Acceptance of homosexuality is increasing in the region—according to Latinobarómetro, those who would not like to have homosexuals as neighbors has dropped from 59% in 1995 to 29% in 2009—but only from a very high level of homophobia. Despite evidence of increasing social tolerance, the Catholic Church still exerts huge sway.

Civil unions can offer the meat and potatoes of the m-word while treading lightly on the hollowed ground associated with it. Recognizing this, activists should seek to extend the rights of civil unions enjoyed in certain cities nationwide. Doing so would also lay the legal foundation for more progressive legal challenges. This incremental view is bound to annoy, but is an important and meaningful half step.

Latin America is unlikely to host a rainbow row in the near term. Perhaps we are witnessing a chasm emerge between the more progressive capitals—Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Mexico City—and the flinty heartlands. Regardless, one thing seems certain: as empowered activists face off against the vanguard of traditional values, there is sure to be a major row over the rainbow.